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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES L.C, aka 
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES LLC 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STRAND and CARI ALLEN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code §78-36-10.3. §78-27-56. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and (c) 
and, Utah R.Evid. 613(b). 
Courtesy Copies of Documents Supporting Defendants Claims for Oral Argument filed 
07/25/08 
2. April 25, 1983 $2,000 check by Strand (d.b.a. B.I. Associates) to Nupetco 
Associates and (Wayne Petty) Moyle & Draper for legal fee's / Excerpts of Attorney Dan 
Jackson's billing statements dated June 30,1985 [sic] 1983 and November 20, 1985. 
3. Affidavit of Michael Strand dated March 20,1985. (Civil No. C 85-03 51W) 
4. Second Amended Complaint dated September 23,1985. (Civil No. C 85-0351W) 
5. Affidavit of Lohr Livingston dated March 1985 (Civil No. C 85-0351W) 
6. Attorney Dan Jackson's Affidavit dated February 28,2008. 
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1191 JUDICIAL CODE 78-36-10.5 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with 
Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of 
occupancy during the litigation's pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between 
the parties can be adjudicated without further pro-
ceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and 
enter judgment on the merits. 
(3) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer in which the 
claim is for nuisance and alleges an act that would be 
considered criminal under the laws of this state, the court 
shall hold an evidentiary hearing within ten days after 
the day on which the complaint is filed to determine 
whether the alleged act occurred. 
(b) The hearing required by Subsection (3)(a) shall be 
set at the time the complaint is filed and notice of the 
hearing shall be served upon the defendant with the 
summons at least three calendar days before the sched-
uled time of the hearing. 
(c) If the court, at an evidentiary hearing held in 
accordance with Subsection (3)(a), determines that it is 
more likely than not that the alleged act occurred, the 
court shall issue an order of restitution. 
(d) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance 
with Subsection (3)(c), a constable or the sheriff of the 
county where the property is situated shall return posses-
sion of the property to the plaintiff immediately. 
(e) The court may allow a period of up to 72 hours 
before restitution may be made under Subsection (3)(d) if 
the court determines the time is appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
(f) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with 
Subsection (3)(a), if the court determines that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without further 
proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and 
enter judgment on the merits. 
(g) "An act that would be considered criminal under the 
laws of this state" under Subsection (3)(a) includes only 
the following: 
(i) an act that would be considered a felony under 
the laws of this state; 
(ii) an act that would be considered criminal affect-
ing the health or safety of a tenant, the landlord, the 
landlord's agent, or other person on the landlord's 
property; 
(iii) an act that would be considered criminal that 
causes damage or loss to any tenant's property or the 
landlord's property; 
(iv) a drug- or gang-related act that would be 
considered criminal; 
(v) an act or threat of violence against any tenant 
or other person on the premises, or against the 
landlord or the landlord's agent; and 
(vi) any other act that would be considered crimi-
nal that the court determines directly impacts the 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by any tenant. 
™) (a) At any hearing held in accordance with this chapter 
m which the tenant after receiving notice fails to appear, 
the court shall issue an order of restitution. 
(b) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance 
^ t h Subsection (4)(a), a constable or the sheriff of the 
county where the property is situated shall return posses-
sion of the property to the plaintiff immediately. 
V c o u r t adjudicating matters under this chapter may 
e
 other orders as are appropriate and proper. 2007 
•10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent 
QS ~7 Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
va) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises as 
provided m Section 78-36-10.5. 
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of 
the lease or agreement under which the property is held, 
or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall 
also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(d) (i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not 
release a defendant from any obligation for payments 
on a lease for the remainder of the lease's term. 
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obliga-
tion on either party to mitigate damages. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without 
a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the 
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's ten-
ancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at 
trial; 
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged 
unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
amounts due under the contract; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as pro-
vided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed 
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(e), and for reasonable 
attorney fees. 
(4) (a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution 
upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and 
enforced immediately. 2007 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforce-
ment — Disposition of personal property — 
Hearing. 
(1) Each order of restitution shall: 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove 
his personal property, and restore possession of the pre-
mises to the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or 
constable; 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the 
court for the defendant to vacate the premises, which 
shall be three calendar days following service of the order, 
unless the court determines that a longer or shorter 
period is appropriate under the circumstances; and 
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a 
hearing to contest the manner of its enforcement. 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the 
defendant to request a hearing as listed on the form shall 
be served in accordance with Section 78-36-6 by a person 
authorized to serve process pursuant to Subsection 78-
12a-2(l). If personal service is impossible or impractica-
ble, service may be made by: 
(i) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the 
defendant's last-known address and posting a copy of 
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the 
premises; or 
(ii) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the 
commercial tenant defendant's last-known place of 
business and posting a copy of the order and the form 
at a conspicuous place on the business premises. 
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay 
enforcement of the restitution order unless: 
(i) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash 
bond, certified funds, or a property bond to the clerk 
of the court in an amount approved by the court 
78-27-50.5 JUDICIAL CODE 1146 
(a) local police; 
(b) a sheriff; 
(c) a peace officer; 
(d) a city at torney; 
(e) a county attorney; 
(f) a district attorney; 
(g) the attorney general; 
(h) the Department of Public Safety; 
(i) the Office of Recovery Services of the Department of 
Human Services; 
(j) the Insurance Department; 
(k) the Department of Commerce; 
(1) the Benefit Payment Control Unit or the Payment 
Error Prevention Unit of the Department of Workforce 
Services; 
(m) the state auditor; or 
(n) the State Tax Commission. 
(2) Except for the Office of Recovery Services, if a govern-
menta l enti ty listed in Subsection (1) seeks a record, the entity 
shall obtain the record as follows: 
(a) if the record is a nonprotected record, by request in 
writing that: 
(i) certifies that an official investigation is being 
conducted; and 
(ii) is signed by a representative of the governmen-
tal entity that is conducting the official investigation; 
or 
(b) if the record is a protected record, by obtaining: 
(i) a subpoena authorized by s ta tute ; or 
(ii) other legal process: 
(A) ordered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion; and 
(B) served upon the financial institution. 
(3) If the Office of Recovery Services seeks a record, it shall 
obtain the record pu r suan t to: 
(a) Subsection 62A-11-104(7); 
(b) Section 62A-11-304.1; 
(c) Section 62A-11-304.5; or 
(d) Title IV, Pa r t D of the Social Security Act as codified 
in 42 U.S.C. 651 et seq. 
(4) A financial inst i tut ion may not give notice to any person 
named or referenced within the record disclosed pursuant to 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(5) In accordance with Section 78-27-48, the agency con-
ducting the official investigation tha t obtains a record from a 
financial inst i tut ion under this section shall reimburse the 
financial inst i tut ion for costs reasonably and directly incurred 
by the financial insti tution. 2005 
78-27-50.5. Liability of financial institutions. 
A financial inst i tut ion is not liable to any person named or 
referenced wi th in a record: 
(1) for any disclosure t ha t is the result of a subpoena, 
order, or request made pursuan t to Sections 78-27-45 
through 78-27-50 if the financial institution reasonably 
believes t h a t the subpoena, order, or request is properly 
made under Sections 78-27-45 through 78-27-50; or 
(2) for any disclosure or action taken in good faith 
p u r s u a n t to a da ta match or administrative subpoena 
provided for by the s ta tu tes listed in Subsection 78-27-
50(3). 1999 
78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy. 
The Legislature finds t ha t the sport of skiing is practiced by 
a large n u m b e r of residents of Utah and at t racts a large 
number of nonresidents , significantly contributing to the 
economy of th is s ta te . It further finds tha t few insurance 
carr iers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to 
ski area operators and tha t the premiums charged by those 
carr iers have r isen sharply in recent years due to confusion as 
to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of 
skiing. I t is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law 
in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that 
sport, to establish as a mat te r of law t h a t certain risks are 
inherent in tha t sport, and to provide that , as a matter of 
public policy, no person engaged in t h a t sport shall recover 
from a ski operator for injuries result ing from those inherent 
risks. 1979 
78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Inherent r isks of skiing" means those dangers or 
conditions which are an integral pa r t of the sport of 
recreational, competitive, or professional skiing, includ-
ing, bu t not limited to: 
(a) changing weather conditions; 
(b) snow or ice conditions as they exist or may 
change, such as hard pack, powder, packed powder, 
wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, or ma-
chine-made snow; 
(c) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare 
spots, forest growth, rocks, s tumps, streambeds, 
cliffs, t rees, and other na tu ra l objects; 
(d) variations or steepness in terrain, whether 
na tu ra l or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or 
grooming operations, and other terra in modifications 
such as terra in parks , and te r ra in features such as 
jumps , rails, fun boxes, and all other constructed and 
na tu ra l features such as half pipes, quar ter pipes, or 
freestyle-bump terrain; 
(e) impact with lift towers and other structures 
and their components such as signs, posts, fences or 
enclosures, hydrants , or water pipes; 
(f) collisions with other skiers; 
(g) participation in, or practicing or training for. 
competitions or special events; and 
(h) the failure of a skier to ski within the skier's 
own ability. 
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property 
damage or loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for 
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, 
freestyle, or other types of ski jumping, using skis, sled, 
tube, snowboard, or any other device. 
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area 
operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other 
type of ski jumping, and snowboarding. 
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and then 
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who oper-
ate a ski area. 200« 
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim 
or recovery from operator for injury from, 
risks inherent in sport. 
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim 
against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injurf 
resul t ing from any of the inherent risks of skiing. UK 
78-27-54. I n h e r e n t r i sks of s k i i n g — Trail boards liste 
i n g i n h e r e n t r i sks a n d l imi ta t ions o n liability 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more 
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include 
a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and the limitations ot 
liability of ski a rea operators, a s defined in this act. 1W 
78-27-55. Repealed. m 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action « 
defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable atto^ 
n e / s fees to a prevailing par ty if the court determines thattki 
1147 JUDICIAL CODE 78-27-61 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited 
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecunios-
ity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
1988 
# 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to re-
cover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 1986 
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state funded 
agency in act ion against state or subdivis ion 
— Forfeit of appropriated monies . 
Any agency or organization receiving state funds which, as 
a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof, 
receives attorney's fees and costs as all or part of a settlement 
or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund, from its appropri-
ated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received. 
1981 
78-27-58. Repealed. 2003 
78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters. 
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any 
person which provides shelter, food, clothing, or other prod-
ucts or services without consideration to indigent persons. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient 
shelters, owners, operators, and employees of transient shel-
ters, and persons who contribute products or services to 
transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages or 
injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured 
person's use of the products or services provided by the 
transient shelter. 
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person 
for damages or injury intentionally caused by that person or 
resulting from his gross negligence. 1986 
78-27-60. Limited immunity for architects and engi-
neers inspect ing earthquake damage. 
(1) A professional engineer licensed under Title 58, Chapter 
22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors Licensing Act, 
or an architect licensed under Title 58, Chapter 3a, Architects 
Licensing Act, who provides structural inspection services at 
the scene of a declared national, state, or local emergency 
caused by a major earthquake is not liable for any personal 
injury, wrongful death, or property damage caused by the good 
faith inspection for structural integrity or nonstructural ele-
ments affecting health and safety of a structure used for 
human habitation or owned by a public entity if the inspection 
is performed: 
(a) voluntarily, without compensation or the expecta-
tion of compensation; 
(b) at the request of a public official or city or county 
building inspector acting in an official capacity; and 
(c) within 30 days of the earthquake. 
(2) The immunity provided for in Subsection (1) does not 
apply to gross negligence or willful misconduct. 1997 
(a) (i) "Amusement park" means any permanent in-
door or outdoor facility or park where amusement 
rides are available for use by the general public. 
(ii) "Amusement park" does not include a ski re-
sort, a traveling show, carnival, or fair. 
(b) "Amusement ride" means a device or attraction at 
an amusement park which carries or conveys passengers 
along, around, or over a fixed or restricted route or course 
or allows the passenger to steer or guide it within an 
established area for the purpose of giving its passengers 
amusement, pleasure, thrills, or excitement. "Amusement 
ride" includes: 
(i) any water-based recreational attraction, includ-
ing all water slides, wave pools, and water parks; and 
(ii) typical rides, including roller coasters, whips, 
ferris wheels, and merry-go-rounds. 
(c) "Intoxicated" means a person is under the influence 
of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance hav-
ing the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree tha t 
the person may endanger himself or another, in a public 
place or in a private place where he unreasonably dis-
turbs other persons. 
(d) "Operator" means any person, firm, or corporation 
tha t owns, leases, manages, or operates an amusement 
park or amusement ride and all employees and agents of 
the amusement park. 
(e) "Rider" means any person who is: 
(i) waiting in the immediate vicinity of an amuse-
ment ride in order to get on the ride; 
(ii) in the process of leaving the ride but remains in 
its immediate vicinity; or 
(iii) a passenger or participant on an amusement 
ride. 
(2) An amusement park shall inform riders in writing, 
where appropriate, of the nature of the ride, including factors 
which would assist riders in determining whether they should 
participate in the ride activity and the rules concerning 
conduct on each ride. Information concerning the rules of 
conduct may be given verbally at the beginning of each ride 
segment or posted in writing conspicuously at the entrance to 
each ride. 
(3) Riders are responsible for obeying the posted rules and 
verbal instructions of the amusement ride operator. 
(4) A rider may not: 
(a) board or dismount from an amusement ride except 
at a designated area; 
(b) board an amusement ride if he has a physical 
condition that may be aggravated by participation on the 
ride; 
(c) disconnect, disable, or attempt to disconnect or 
disable, any safety device, seat belt, harness, or other 
restraining device before, during, or after movement of 
the amusement ride has started except at the express 
instruction of the operator; 
(d) throw or expel any object from an amusement ride; 
(e) act in any manner contrary to posted or oral rules 
while boarding, riding, or dismounting from an amuse-
ment ride; or 
(f) engage in any reckless act or activity which m a y 
injure himself or others. 
(5) A rider may not board or at tempt to board any amuse-
ment ride if he is intoxicated. 
(a) An operator of an amusement park ride may pre-
vent a rider who is perceptibly or apparently intoxicated 
from boarding an amusement ride. 
(b) An operator who prevents a rider from boarding a n 
amusement ride under this section, is not criminally or 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses. 
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness concerning a 
prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need not be 
shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the same 
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a 
prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded 
an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an 
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise 
require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in 
Rule 801(d)(2). 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Subsection (a) abandons the position in Queens 
Case, 129 English Reports 976 (1820), requiring that the cross-examiner, prior to 
examining a witness about his written statement, must first show the statement to the 
witness and is comparable to the substance of Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The substance of Subsection (b) was formerly in Rule 22(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Judson T.Pitts (9946) 
The Rose & Pitts Law Office 
45 W. Sego Lily Dr. Ste #201 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Email: Judsonpitts @ hotmail.com 
Telephone: (801) 265-8200 
Fax: (801) 352-7657 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, BOUNTIFUL DIVISION 
GOLSEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.C., 
AKA 
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL W. STRAND AND CARI ALLEN, 
Defendants. 
COURTESY COPIES OF. DOCUMENTS 
SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS CLAIMS 
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Civil No. 070700488 
Judge. Glen R. Dawson 
Attached hereto are courtesy copies of documents that support the facts, arguments, and 
contentions set forth in the Defendant's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and to Amend Judgment 
for Irregularities in the Proceeding. These documents are referenced in the Motion, and may be 
referenced during Oral Argument. The documents are provided in whole, rather than in abridged 
format, so that the context surrounding them may be fully discerned. Accordingly, because of 
their voluminous nature, they are provided in this format. 
Dated this J7&_ dav of July. 2008 
JUDSON PITTS 
Attorney for Defendants 
1. Golden Meadows Properties' Objection to Machinery & Hardware Supply's Motion for 
Relief From the Automatic Stay filed on May 6, 2003. Order For Relief From the Automatic 
Stay filed June 4, 2003 (Case No. 02-37988JAB). 
2. July 21, 2000 personal guarantee document. Trustee's Deed filed on November 19, 2003 
and Nupetco Associates check no. 7075 to Ralph Petty Esq dated November 20, 2003. Page one 
of the Abstract of Title for the Property. 
3. Affidavits of John Caine, Nathan Drage and Howard Johnson filed September 10, 2007 
(Golden Meadows Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case No. 040700433 Judge Memmott). 
4. Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment filed October 31, 2007 and 
Order filed November 1, 2007 (Golden Meadows Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case No. 
040700433 Judge Memmott). 
5. Golden Meadows Complaint against Allen dated June 22, 2004 and served on March 25, 
2008 (Case no. 040700433 Judge Memmott). 
6. Cari Allen's Verified Answer and Counterclaim dated April 23, 2008 (Golden Meadows 
Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case no. 040700433 Judge Memmott). 
7. Attorney Dan Jackson's Affidavit dated February 28, 2008 filed by the Defendants in 
Opposition to the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael Strand and Cari Allen and in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Golden Meadows v. Michael Strand and Cari 
Allen - Case No. 070700488). 
8. Excerpts of Attorney Dan Jackson's billing statements dated June 30, 1985 and 
November 20,1985. 
9. Partial accounting list between Neuman Petty et al and Michael Strand et al titled 
"From June 1, 1982" with the notation that on April 25, 1983 $2,000 was paid by Strand et al to 
Nupetco Associates and (Wayne Petty) Moyle & Draper for legal fee's and supporting check 
number 0211922. 
10. Excerpts of the Amended Counterclaim filed by Petty et al dated June 19, 2008 (pg. 6 -
with a September 3, 1987 notation that Nupetco Associates paid Strand's legal fees to Daniel W. 
Jackson). Michael Strand, individually and as successor in interest to MINGO OIL COMPANY, 
MINGO OIL PRODUCERS, and other MICHAEL STRAND entities v. NEUMAN PETTY, 
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, and KAMCO WYOMING CORPORTION, and other NEUMAN 
PETTY entities (Case No. 070915796 Judge Iwasaki) 
11. Affidavit of Michael Strand dated March 20, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary 
Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-03515W). 
12. Affidavit of Lohr Livingston dated March 19, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary 
Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0351W). 
13. Affidavit of David Floor dated March 20, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary 
Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W). 
14. Affidavit of Michael Strand dated July 10, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary 
Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C895-0315W). 
15. Affidavit of David Floor dated July 10,1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris 
and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W). 
16. Complaint filed by Michael Strand against The Citizens Bank (Michael Strand vs. The 
Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731) dated July 23,1985. 
17. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Strand dated July 23, 1985. TRO 
entered on July 25,1985 and $20,000 bond posted by Nupetco Associates for Strand (Michael 
Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731). 
18. Motion to Join Nupetco Associates as Additional Plaintiff dated June 28,1985 (Michael 
Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W). 
19. Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Michael Strand on September 5, 1985 and, 
Minute Entry dated September 4, 1985 denying the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Michael 
Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731). 
20. Stipulation and Motion for Judgment of Dismissal dated September 12, 1985 and 
Judgment of Dismissal. Order Authorizing Release of Funds entered September 12, 1985. Check 
No. 1114 for $20,000 from the Davis County Clerk to Michael Strand and copy of the check 
endorsed to Neuman Petty by Michael Strand (Michael Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 
1-37731). 
21. Second Amended Complaint against Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizen's Bank 
dated September 23, 1985 and Ruling entered September 15, 1989 (Michael Strand and Nupetco 
Associates v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W). 
22. Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Attorney Dan Jackson dated April 12, 1988 (Michael 
Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731.) 
23. Ruling by the Honorable Judge Morris entered on June 4, 2008 (DIANE DIMEO, 
personal Representative of the Estate of Eleanor Amelia Millie Newberry Strand, Deceased v. 
Nupetco Associates - Case No. 060700354). 
24. Correspondence between attorney's Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty, Sidney Baucom, and 
Frank Wilkins dated December 8, 2005. Correspondence between attorney Mark Tolman and 
Michael Strand dated May, 10, 2007. Correspondence between James Swindler and Mark 
Tolman dated July 12, 2007. 
25. Verified Complaint Michael Strand, individually and as successor in interest to MINGO 
OIL COMPANY, MINGO OIL PRODUCERS, and other MICHAEL STRAND entities v. 
NEUMAN PETTY, NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, and KAMCO WYOMING CORPORTION, and 
other NEUMAN PETTY entities (Case No. 070915796 Judge Iwasaki) filed November 6, 2007. 
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DON A. STRINGHAM 
NEIL R. SA9 IN 
Michael W. Strand 
P. 0. Box 2519 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
June 30, 1983 
STATEMENT 
Balance from April 30, 1983 billing: 
Payment of 5-17-83 
Payment of 5-31-83 
May billings: 
DWJ FEES 
PARALEGAL FEES 
June billings: 
DWJ FEES 
Clerk Fees 
Costs Advanced 
Copies 
Filing fees 
$4,591.00 
(1,000.00) 
(4,000.00) 
3,224.75 
323.50 
2,250.00 
2,470.00 
125.05 
32.00 
TOTAL DUE $7,925.55 
DWJ MAY 
STRAND 
5-2-83 
8:45-9:00 
10:15-11:00 
11:00-12:30 
12:30-1:00 
3:30-4:30 
4:30-5:00 
5-3-83 
9:30-11:45 
3:15-3:45 
4:45-5:45 
5-4-83 
9:30-9:45 
4:00-4:30 
4:30-6:00 
3:45-4:00 
5-5-83 
9:30- 11:00 
12:00-2:00 
3:40-3:55 
4:15-4:30 
4:30-5:00 
5:30-5:55 
.25 hour 
.75 
1.50 
.50 
1.00 
.50 
2.25 hou 
.50 
1.00 
.25 
.50 < 
1.50 
.25 
1.50 
2.00 
.25 
.25 
.50 
.50 
I* * 
Phone conversation with Mike re: 
Mingo Oil hearing. 
Preparing for hearing. 
Hearing re: Mingo Oil Producers 
Rehash of hearing. 
Editing memorandum and affidavit for 
opposition to Hammons motion for 
summary judgment in promissory note case, 
Meeting wiht Strand and Newman Petty. 
Meeting before and then hearing in 
Hammons motion for summary judgment. 
..-Responses to~~ requests foV production 
of documents. \ \ 
_ \ 
Research re: relief from summary judgment, 
Phone conversation with Strand re 
urrent developments. 
Bullshit. > 
Strategy meeting with Wayne Petty and 
Newman Petty, Strand. 
Heariang on continuance of Adv. Pro. 
Mingo Oil hearing. 
Travel to Farmington, hearing on Mingo 
Oil; meeting with First Sec. Bank. 
Mark Carpenter. 
Meeting with Strand, John Caine re: 
upcoming Mingo hearing.! 
Phone conersation with Bob Cleary re; 
Prarie Gold. 
Drafting subpoena for William Shaw. 
Drafting Subpoena for William Shaw. 
Phone conversation with Rolf Berger 
1RAND- DWJ .AY 
•6-83 
11:15-12:30 1.25 
12:30- 2:00 
2:35-2:50 
3:15-4:15 
1.50 
.25 
1.00 
fl 0 
< 
A' 
Meeting with William Shaw re: First Sec. 
Bank's accounting of Jammons funds. 
REviewing with Strand, Wayne Petty and 
Newman Petty the information from First 
Sec. Bank. 
Reviewing proposed order submitted 
in the promissory note case-Hammons. 
Reviewing transcript of Hearing in Adv, 
Pro. 82PM-0203. 
- 1 1 - 8 3 
9 : 0 0 - 1 0 : 0 0 
1 0 : 0 0 - 1 1 : 0 0 
1 1 : 0 0 - 1 1 : 3 0 
. -16-83 
9 : 1 5 - 1 0 : 0 0 
1 .00 
1 .00 
. 5 0 
. 7 5 
11:00-11:30 .50 
3:00-4:15 1.25 
4 : 4 5 - 9 : 1 3 I 
5-20-83 
4 : 0 0 - 4 : 1 5 
2 : 0 0 - 3 : 0 0 
3 : 0 0 - 5 : 1 5 
4 : 0 0 - 6 : 4 5 
4 . 5 0 
. 2 5 
1.00 
1 . 25 
2 . 7 5 
5-25-83 
8:00-8:15 25 
Review transcript of Davis county hearing. 
Attend hearing Mingo oil Prod. vs. 
Trustee. 
Review current position and future strategy 
Drafting notice of disclosure haering 
research on notice. 
Finalizing notice of disclosure. 
Reviewing money problems and related 
matters for meeting with Petty. 
Meeting with Strand, Petty, Wayne Petty, re 
thinas to do. 
Phone conversation Wayne Petty. 
Drafting new repayment agreement. 
Meeting with Wayne Petty re: repayment 
agreement, relationship of Petty-Strand. 
Waiting for Mike until 5:15 then meeting wi 
Wayne, Newman Petty and Mike re: 
agreement. 
Meeting with clerk re Strand reconsiderat 
of ETC judgment. 
DWJ 
STRAND MAY 
5-25-83 
3:45-4:00 .25 Phone conversation. op*3 
.,7-16 •/ 
bV 
i 
5-26-83 
10:45-11:00 .25 
4:15-4:30 
5:00-5:15 
3:30-7:00 
6-1-83 
9:00-9:45 
25 
.25 
5-27-83 
11:00-11:30 .50 
3.50 
5-30-83 
10:15=12:30 2.25 
5-31-83 
9:30-10:30 1.00 
12:15-12:30 .25 
.75 
Phone conversation with Mike re: recent 
developments. 
Phone conversation with Wayne Petty 
re: Heyrend motion. 
Phone conversation Strand re: 
repayment agreement. 
Reveiwing Adv. Pro. NO $940 file, 
Meeting with Strand, Petty, re: 
finalizing agreements. 
Drafting reply letter to Mike Sheppard 
re: reply to Barbers letters. 
Attend supp order hearing Hammons. 
Phone conversation Dwayne Gillman 
re: objection to disclosure. 
Edit letter to Mike Sheppard. 
TOTAL DWJ 42.75 hours at 75.00 ea. = 3,206.25 
Shelley 
5- 6-83 
10:30-11:15 .75 
5-16-83 
12:00-7:00 7.00 
ued. Getting Shaw subp-oef 
Putting together and mialing of Notice 
of hearing fob-^lan of Reorganization. 
Total Shelley 7.75 hours at 30.00 = 232.50 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Law Office 
JACKSON & WILKINSON 
A Professional Corporation 
40 East South Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 538-0645 
November 20, 1985 
Michael Strand 
P. 0. Box 2519 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
S T A T E M E N T 
FOR SERVICES RENDERED through November 15. 1985: 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
Daniel W. Jackson 101.5 hrs @ $100.00 $10,150.00 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 84.45 hrs § 70.00 5,911.50 
Donna Somma 16. hrs @ 25.00 400.00 
COSTS ADVANCED: 
Phone calls, service and filing fees 
PREVIOUS BALANCE DUE 
PAYMENT (thank you) 
CREDIT 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE AND OWING 
9,461.32 
13,000.00 
288.05 
(3,538.68) 
$13,210.87 
An itemization of the services rendered will be 
furnished upon any request 
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II 
cm 
Trustee 
letter \ 
agreemer 
Gillman I 
11/22 11-12 1.00 
Phone conversation with MiH 
re settlement with trustee 
Meeting with Ron Jackson 
representative 
Finalizing settlement of 
suit 
Meeting about 
contempt action re 
creditors 
Drafting settlement 
with trustee 
Meeting with Dwayne 
settlement 
Meeting with Mike Re n( 
cases, minutemen settlement 
Discuss opt-ions to prevei 
enforcement of Minutem* 
judgment 
Phone conversations wit 
Michael Heyrend and Mike i 
Settlement of Minutement suit 
Phone conservation with Wayr 
Petty re settlement agreement 
Phone conversation i 
settlement and bargainii 
position with Petty 
Meeting with Wayne Pett} 
Newman, and Strand i 
settlement agreement wit 
trustee 
Phone conversation re Pett 
problem 
Phone conversation with Mi!< 
re settlement Nupecto sale 
Phone conversation with Duar 
re exclusion of Petty frc 
settlement 
Phone conversation Wayne Pett 
re Terms of settlement ar 
exclusion of Petty frc 
settement agreement 
Phone conversation with Wayr 
petty and judge Wilkins r 
settlement 
Meeting with Dwayne 
settlement 
Editing settlement 
in Overland Dome 
Editing settlement 
in Overland Dome 
Editing, redrafting 
agreement re Overland Dome 
Phone conversation i 
settlement agreement wit 
Hammons 
Editing, settlement agreement 
Gillman i 
agreemer 
agreemer 
settlemer 
DANIEL W. JACKSON 
BRADLEY, ARROWSMITH & JACKSON 
40 East South Temple, Su i te 310 
Sol t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-1919 CLERK 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Cen t ra l D i v i s i o n 
MICHAEL STRAND, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS, 
and THE CITIZENS BANK, 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT 
C i v i l No. C85-0315W 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) ss 
Comes now Michael S t r a n d , being f i r s t d u l y sworn, de-
poses end says: 
1 , A f f i a n t i s the P l a i n t i f f i n the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d 
ma t te r , 
2. During November 1984, Affiant notified Defendant 
Gary Harris that Defendant The Citizens Bank (Citizens) was in 
possession of 40,500 shares of common stock of Global Oil 
Company, 
3, On February 7, 1985, Affiant caused demand to be 
made on Defendant Bill Taylor for the return of said stock, 
4, On February 26, 1985, Defendant Taylor responded to 
Affiant's prior demand and stated that the stock in auestion had 
been sold and the proceeds applied to the loan between Plain-
tiff and Defendant Citizens, 
5, On February 22, 1982, Plaintiff executed a Promis-
sory Note whereby he promised to pay Defendant Citizens $390,000, 
Said Promissory Note obligation was secured by a Trust Deed on 
Plaintiff's residence and by an airplane hangar located at the 
Salt Lake International Airport. 
6, At no time did Affiant authorize the sale of said 
stock or the application of the proceeds of that unauthoized 
sale to the loan in auestion, 
7, At no time were the 40,500 shares of Global Oil 
Company stock pledged as security for the repayment of the loan, 
8, By agreement dated October 11, 1984, Plaintiff ana 
Defendants renewed the obligation evidenced by the Promissory 
Note, 
9, At the time of the unauthorized sale of the stock 
in auestion, Plaintiff had complied with all the terms of the 
October extension. 
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10. Following his written demand, Affiant had a tele-
phone conversation with Defendant Taylor in which Affiant again 
reauesteti the return of the stock. During that conversation, 
Defendant Taylor asked Affiant if he had made any additional 
payments on the obligation evidenced by the Promissory Note, 
Affiant responded that he had not made any payments pending the 
return o x the stock. Defendant Taylor stated that basea on the 
circumstances he would notice the Affiant's house for Trustees 
sale, 
11, On February 21, 1985, said Notice of Trustee's 
sale scheduled for March 21, 1985 was attached to Affiant's 
residence by Defendant Citizens. Affiant does not have suffi-
cient funds available to purchase the house at the Trustee's 
sale, Affiant also believes that Defendant Citizens intends to 
sell Plaintiff's airplane hangar located at the Salt Lake 
International Airport, 
12. Affiant considered the statements by Defendant cs 
a threat that if Affiant did not ratify the unauthorized sale of 
the stock and the application of the proceeds therefrom to his 
indebtedness, Defendants would sell his residence at a Trustee's 
Sale and thereby cause substantial irreparable harm to his fi-
nancial condition; reputation and personal relationships, 
13, Affiant had an appraisal done on his residence in 
1981. Said Appraisal shows the residence to be valued at 
$428,400, Citizens presently holds a secured position behid a 
first mortgage of approximately $60,000,00. 
Dated this 2/~M day of March, 1985, 
MICHAEL STRAND 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this S>L1ln day of 
March, 1985, 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing ct 
My Commission Expires: JrJ/7// ^^/^'^ <'f/tnJ> 
DANIEL W. JACKSON 
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON 
JACKSON & WILKINSON 
40 E a s t Sou th Temple , S u i t e 310 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 
T e l e p h o n e (801) 538 -0645 
A t t o r n e y f o r M i c h a e l S t r a n d 
Wayne G. P e t t y 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
N. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0250 
Attorney for Nupeco Associates 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Central Division 
MICHAEL STRAND and NUPETCO ) 
ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited ) 
Partnership, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ] 
BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS, 
and THE CITIZENS BANK, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C85-0315W.. Q 
Plaintiffs, Michael Strand, by and through his 
attorney, Daniel W. Jackson, and Nupetco Associates, by and 
through its attorney, Wayne Petty, respectively, Complain and 
allege against the Defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff, Michael Strand, is a resident of Utah, 
residing at 1199 South 1500 East, Bountiful, Utah. 
2. Nupetco Associates is a Utah Limited Partnership 
with its principal place of business at 2006 South 900 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Defendant Bill Taylor (hereinafter referred to as 
Taylor), is a resident of the State of Utah and an Assistant 
Vice President of Defendant The Citizens Bank. 
4. Defendant Gary Harris (hereinafter referred to as 
Harris), is a resident of the State of Utah and the President of 
Defendant The Citizens Bank. 
5. Defendant The Citizens bank (hereinafter referred 
to as Citizens), is a banking institution organized and operated 
in the State of Utah with offices in Salt Lake City and Ogden, 
Utah. 
6. This Court has jurisdiction over the first cause of 
action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c). The Court has jurisdic-
tion over the second, third and fourth causes of action which 
constitute claims based on State Law which are pendant no and 
involve the same facts and circumstances as the federal action. 
7. Venue for this action is proper in the Federal Dis-
trict Court of Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 51391(a) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1965(a) . 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Defendant Citizens is a commercial bank operating 
in the State of Utah which has branch offices in Salt Lake City 
and Ogden, Utah. Said business was organized and operates under 
the laws of the State of Utah as a full service banking institu-
tion. In pursuance of the business of Citizens, the means of 
interstate commerce are employed on a daily basis. 
9. Defendant Citizens constitutes an "enterprise" as 
that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §1964(4) which is engaged in 
and the activites of which affect interstate commerce* 
10. Defendants Taylor and Harris are employed by and 
associated with Defendant Citizens and act as officers of that 
enterprise. 
11. Prior to February 24, 1981, Plaintiff Strand di-
rected David Floor to open a special account at that brokerage 
firm in the name of Phillip Johnson and The Citizens Bank. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff Strand delivered Global Oil Company 
certificate Number SL-001172 representing 50,000 shares of 
common stock to Mr. Floor with instructions that the shares 
represented thereby be deposited in that account. At the time 
said account was opened, Phillip Johnson was an officer and 
employer of Defendant Citizens and was acting as their agent in 
---»-- ~^r< nn rmpstion. 
connection with the transaction. Thereafter on January 9, 1985 
Defendant Taylor deposited the same Global Oil Company stock 
back into account #114325 and directed David Floor to sell said 
shares of stock at the best available price over the next five 
cays. Shortly thereafter, on January 23, 1985 Defendants Harris 
and Taylor authorized the sale of said shares by Olsen & Com-
pany. Said sale was ordered by Defendants Harris and Taylor 
without judicial foreclosure or notice to Plaintiffs and Plain-
tiffs did not authorize or direct the sale of said stock. See 
Affidavit of Bill Taylor a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
19. On February 17, 1985, Plaintiff Strand formally 
demanded that Defendants Taylor and Citizens return the stock to 
his possession. Said demand is evidenced by a letter from James 
N. Barber acting as Attorney for Plaintiff to Defendant Taylor 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", 
20. By letter dated February 26, 1985f and attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D,n Defendant Taylor acknowledged receipt of 
Plaintiff Strand's demand for return of the stock and explained 
that the stock had been sold and the proceeds applied to a debt 
between Plaintiff Strand and the Defendant Bank. 
21. The obligation mentioned in Defendant Taylor's 
letter of February 26, is the renewal of Note Number 32-10156-0 
in the principal amount of $390,000 and evidence by a promissory 
note dated February 22, 1982. Said promissory note which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E* was secured by a Trust Deed on 
Plaintiff Strand's residence located at 1199 South 1500 East, 
Bountiful, and an airplane hanger located at the Salt Lake In-
ternational Airport. 
22. The loan identified in paragraph 21 represents the 
renewal of an earlier loan between Defendant Citizens and Plain-
tiff Strand. 
23. On February 11, 1983, Defendant Citizens and 
Plaintiff Strand entered into an agreement whereby they agreed 
to defer payment of the debt. Said extension of the obligation 
is evidenced by letter agreement which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit n F \ 
24. The Same parties entered into a second agreement 
on November 29, 1983 whereby they agreed to accept certain pay-
ments from Plaintiff Strand and defer repayment of the total 
debt. Said agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "G". 
25. Again on October 11, 1984, Plaintiff Strand and 
Defendant Citizens entered into a third agreement whereby De-
fendant Citizens agreed to accept payment of $30,000 from Plain-
tiff Strand and defer satisfaction and repayment of the debt 
evidenced by the note in question. Said agreement is evidenced 
by writing executed on October 11, 1984, and attached hereto as 
Exhibit nHn. Pursuant to said agreement, Plaintiff Strand re-
mitted to Defendant Citizens $30,000 from November 1, 1984 
through January 22, 1985. 
26. On or about February 19, 1985, Defendant Taylor 
caused notice of trustee's sale of Plaintiff's residence to be 
given. Said sale of the collateral securing the above-mentioned 
note was set by Defendants for March 21, 1985. Said Notice is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "I". 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Violation 
27. Plaintiff Strand realleges the allegations con-
tained in paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully stated herein. 
28. Defendant Citizens is a commercial enterprise 
which is engaged in and the activities of which affect inter-
state commerce. 
29. During all times material hereto, Defendants 
Taylor and Harris were employed by said enterprise, and as As-
sistant Vice-President and President of Defendant Citizens those 
Defendants participated as principals in the conduct of the af-
fairs of the enterprise. 
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30. On or about January 24, 1985, Defendants Harris 
and Taylor authorized the sale of 40,500 shares of Global Oil 
common stock which they had previously removed from the special 
account at Olsen & Company. Acting pursuant to said authoriza-
tion, Olsen & Company sold said shares and delivered the pro-
ceeds thereof to Defendant Citizens. 
31. Said shares were previously held in the special 
account by Phillip Johnson and Defendant Citizens under the 
bailment in which Plaintiff Strand entrusted said shares to the 
protection and control of Phillip Johnson and Defendant Citizens 
for the sole and exclusive purpose of repaying certain over-
drafts of Overland Oil Field Construction Inc. 
32. At no time, were Defendants Citizens, Harris, or 
Taylor the legal or beneficial owners of said shares of stock, 
33. At the time of the sale in question, Plaintiff 
Nupetco Associates was the lawful owner of said shares of Global 
Oil Company common stock. 
34. Said sale of the 40,500 shares of common stock of 
Global by Defendants Harris and Taylor constitutes a chargeable 
violation of §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that Defendants Harris and Taylor committed theft by exercising 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
35. Pursuant to §76-3-203, U.C.A., said offense is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year and constitutes 
a predicate act or predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(A). 
36. Following said sale, Defendants Harris and Taylor 
have failed and refused to return said shares of common stock to 
Plaintiff Strand. In addition, said Defendants have caused 
notice of a trustee's sale to be issued against Plaintiff's 
Strand's residence. Said notice was issued after Plaintiff 
Strand demanded the return of the shares of stock and following 
his refusal to authorize the application of the proceeds from 
the sale of said stock to the indebtedness secured by that resi-
dence . 
37. The authorization of said trustee's sale under the 
present circumstances constitutes a threat by Defendants Harris 
and Taylor to do an act which would not in itself substantially 
benefit the individual defendants but which would harm substan-
tially Plaintiff Strand with respect to his financial condition, 
reputation and personal relationships. 
38. Said act of authorizing and directing notice of 
Trustee's sale was undertaken by Defendants Harris and Taylor 
after they had exercised control over the property of another to 
wit, the common stock of Global Oil and said acts were done with 
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the purpose of permanently depriving the lawful owner possession 
of the stock. 
39. Said threat of Trustee's sale constitues a charge-
able violation of §76-6-406, U.C.A., Theft by Extortion, which 
is punishable by imprisonment for more than a year and consti-
tutes a predicate act or predicate offense under 18 U.S.C, 
§1961(1)(A). 
40. Prior to November 1984, Defendants had renewed the 
loan between Defendant Citizens and Plaintiff Strand which was 
originally evidenced by Promissory Note Number 32-10156-0. As 
described above, on several occassions, those parties entered 
into agreements both implicit and express whereby the repayment 
or satisfaction of said debt was deferred. All these renewals, 
the last of which occured on October 11, 1984, constitute exten-
sions of credit as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §891(1). 
41. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §891(4) the repayment of any 
extension of credit includes the repayment, satisfaction or dis-
charge in whole or in part of any debt resulting from or in con-
nection with that extension of credit. 
42. To collect an extension of credit is defined in 19 
U.S.C. § 891(5) to mean to induce in any way any person to make 
repayment thereof. 
43. Collection by extortionate means is defined by 18 
U.S.C. §891(7) to include any means involving the use of, an 
express or implicit threat or use of violence or other criminal 
means to cause harm to the person's reputation, property or any 
person. 
44. Defendants Harris and Taylor's unauthorized sale 
of the Global stock and application of the proceeds therefrom to 
repayment of the previous extension of credit constitute a theft 
of said property and the repayment of a portion of an extension 
of credit by the use of criminal means and is an indictable act 
under 18 U.S.C. §894. 
45. Said application of the proceeds of the sale to 
the loan and the issuance of the notice of Trustee's sale to 
induce Plaintiff Strand to ratify said application of proceeds 
constitutes an attempt to collect an extension of credit by the 
use of extortionate means and constitutes an act indictable 
under 18 U.S.C. §894. 
46. Both the unauthorized application of the proceeds 
of the theft and the threat of sale of Plaintiff Strand's resi-
dence if he did not ratify said illegal acts, are predicate acts 
or predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. S1961(l)(5). 
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47. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communications in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails, to directly or indirectly-
(2) obtain money or property by means of any un-
true statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading. . . 
48. At the time Defendants Harris and Taylor offered 
the 40,500 shares of common stock of Global Oil, for sale, they 
did not disclose to Olsen & Company or to the purchaser of said 
shares that they knew Defendant Citizens were not the lawful 
owners of that stock and that they did not have authorization 
from the Plaintiffs for the offer or sale, 
49. Said lack of ownership or authorization, was a 
material fact the disclosure of which was necessary in order to 
make the statements made, i.e., the directive to sell the stock, 
not misleading. 
50. Said material omission was employed by Defendants 
Harris and Taylor" in order to obtain money or property by means 
of the material omissions and the unauthorized sale of said 
stock . 
51. Said offer and sale of the securities were accom-
plished by the use of means and instruments of communication in 
interstate commerce and by the use of the mails. 
52. The failure of Defendants to disclose the illegal 
and unauthorized nature of the offer and sale of the securities 
constitutes a violation of §17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933. 
53. The offering and sale of the securities by Defend-
ants Harris and Taylor represent an offense involving fraud in 
the sale of securities and constitutes a predicate act or of-
fense under 18 U.S.C. S1961(1)(D). 
54. The above described acts constitute a "pattern of 
racketeering activity" as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C, § 
1961(5), to wit, at least two chargeable or indictable acts one 
of which occured after the effective date of §1961 and the last 
of which occured within ten years after the commission of the 
prior act. 
55. Defendants Harris and Taylor engaged in this pat-
tern of racketeering activity in connection with their employ-
ment with Defendant Citizens and in relation to their conduct of 
the business affairs of that enterprise. 
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56. The above-described acts constitute a violation of 
18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and subjects those defendants to Plaintiff 
Strand's private action remedies as provided by 18 U.S.C. 
§1964(c) . 
57. Said acts of Defendants have deprived Plaintiff 
Strand of possession of the 40,500 shares of common stock of 
Global Oil. On March 4, 1985, demand was made upon Plaintiff 
Strand to return said shares to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates or 
make payment of the value thereof. Pursuant to said demand and 
as a result of Defendants' refusal to return the stock, Plain-
tiff Strand has become indebted to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates 
in the total amount of $368,550. 
58. The Defendants1 pattern of racketeering activities 
have therefore damaged Plaintiff Strand in the amount of the 
purchase price of said shares at the time he was required to 
deliver the same to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates. Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. §1964(c) Plaintiff Strand may recover from Defendants 
Harris and Taylor, threefold the damages he has suffered and the 
costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Strand prays for Judgment 
against Defendants Taylor and Harris jointly and severally under 
the First Cause of Action as Follows: 
1, For the award of treble damages as provided by law 
in the amount of $1,105,650 plus prejudgment interest at the 
rate of 12% from January 23, 1985. 
2. For costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's 
fees as provided by 18 U.S.C. §1964(c); and 
3. For any other relief the Court deems just and rea-
sonable . 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Violation 
59. Plaintiffs reallege the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 58 as if fully stated herein. 
60. Defendants unauthorized sale of the Global common 
stock constitutes the exercise of unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to deprive the lawful owner 
thereof and constitutes an illegal act committed for financial 
gain to wit, theft. 
61. Said acts of Defendants Taylor and Harris in exer-
cising control over the stock in question constitute racketeer-
ing as that term is defined by §76-10-1602 (l)(q), U.C.A. 
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62. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on the 
basis of that information and belief allege that Defendants 
Taylor and Harris authorized the issuance of Notice of Trustee's 
Sale involving Plaintiff Strand's residence following Plaintiff 
Strand!s refusal to ratify their misappropriation of the pro-
ceeds of their illegal sale of the Global stock. 
63. Said threat of a trustee's sale of Plaintiff 
Strand's residence can not in itself substantially benefit De-
fendants Taylor and Harris but will cause Plaintiff Strand sub-
stantial harm with respect to his financial condition, reputa-
tion, and personal relationships. 
64. Said act constitutes extortion as that term is 
defined by 76-6-406(1)(i), U.C.A. 
65. Defendants1 threats to sell Plaintiff Strand's 
residence at a trustee's sale, following his refusal to ratify 
'Defendants missappropriation of the Global Stock was done for 
the explicit reason of coercing Plaintiff Strand's acquiesce in 
the Defendants' prior illegal acts and constitutes an attempt to 
commit theft by extortion. 
66. Pursuant to §76-10-1602(1) (g) and (x), said act 
constitutes racketeering by Defendants Taylor and Harris. 
67. Defendant Taylor's application of the proceeds 
from the unauthorized sale of the Global stock to the renewed 
obligation between Plaintiff Strand and Defendant Citizens con-
stitutes the collection of an extension of credit by use of 
criminal means, i.e., theft. 
68. Said use of criminal means to collect the exten-
sion of credit is an act of racketeering as that term is defined 
by §76-10-16.02(l)(k). 
69. The sale of the securities in question by Defend-
ant's Harris and Taylor without disclosure of the fact that they 
nor Defendant Citizens was the owner of said shares constitutes 
an act of fraud in the sale of securities and pursuant to 
§76-10-1602(1)(u) constitutes racketeering by said Defendants. 
70. The various acts enumerated above which were 
undertaken by Defendants Taylor and Harris establish a pattern 
of racketeering activity as defined by §76-10-1602(4). 
71. Said pattern' of racketeering activity was employed 
by Defendants' Harris and Taylor as employees of Defendant 
Citizens, an enterprise, to conduct the business activities of 
that enterprise and constitutes a violation of §76-10-1603(3). 
72. As a result of the pattern of racketeering, Plain-
tiff Strand has suffered damages in the amount of $368,550 and 
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Plaintiff Nupetco has suffered the loss of the value of the se-
curities in question. Pursuant to §76-10-1605 Plaintiffs may 
recover from Defendants Taylor and Harris, treble damages, the 
costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
punitive damages the court may deem reasonable. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
Defendants Taylor and Harris jointly and severally under the 
Second Cause of Action, as follows: 
1. For an award of treble damages as provided by law 
in the amount of $1,105,650 plus prejudgment interest at a rate 
of 12% from January 23, 1985. 
2. For costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's 
fees as provided by §76-10-1605(1); 
3. For Punitive damages in an amount the Court deter-
mines to be appropriate; and 
4. For any other relief the Court deems just and rea-
sonable . 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Conversion 
73. Plaintiff Strand reallege the allegations made m 
paragraphs 1 through 72 as if fully stated herein, Plaintiff 
Nupetco realleges the allegations made in paragraph 1 through 26 
and 60 through 72 as if fully stated herein. 
74. As the Bailor of said shares of common stock of 
Global Oil, Plaintiff Strand had a right to regain possession of 
said scares from Defendant Citizens. 
75. On or aoout, February 7, 1985, Plaintiff Strand 
requested the Defendant Citizens to return the stocK in question 
to his possession. 
76. Defendant refused to return said stock or conform-
ing shares of Global Oil common stock to the possession and con-
trol of Plaintiff Strand, notwithstanding repeated written re-
quests for its return. 
77. Said acts constitute conversion of the common 
stock which has damaged Plaintiff Strand m the amount of 
£368,550. 
V7HEREFORE, Plaintiff Strand prays for Judgment against 
all Defendants jointly and severally under the Third Cause of 
Action, as follows: 
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1. For an award of actual damages in the amount of 
Jp368,550 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum 
from January 23, 1985. 
2. For punitive damages for the intentional conversion 
of the property in an amount to be determined at trial; and 
3. For any other relief the court deems just and rea-
sonable, 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Conversion 
78. Plaintiff Strand reallege the allegations made in 
paragraphs 1 through 77 as if fully stated herein. Plaintiff 
Nupetco realleges the allegations contained in paragraph 1 
through 26 and 60 through 77 as if fully stated herein. 
79. Plaintiff Nupetco Associates is the owner of said 
shares of common stock of Global Oil. 
80. Defendants sale of said common stock constitutes 
an intentional conversion of Plaintiff Nupetco Associates1 
ownership interest which has damaged Plaintiff Nupetco 
Associates in an amount to be determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Nupetco prays for judgment against 
all Defendants jointly and severally under the Fourth Cause of 
Action as follows: 
1. For an award of actual damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum upon the amount from January 23, 1985. 
2. For punitive damages for the intentional conversion 
of the shares of common stock in an amount to be determined at 
trial; and 
3. For any other relief the Court deems just and 
reasonable. 
Dated this .gSfc* day of September, 1985, 
JACKSON & WILKINSON 
40 East South Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
EL W. JACKSON 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
N. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
>y 'W^ 
WAYNE^G. PETTY / 
Plaintiff's Addresses: 
Michael Strand; 1199 South 1500 East, Bountiful, UT 84010 
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates; 2006 South 900 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106 
DANIEL W. JACKSON 
BRADLEY, ARROWSMITH & JACKSON 
40 East South Temple, S u i t e 310 M^R Ei . B ' - l ^ ' S S 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 ^ " 
Telephone (801) 363-1919 .H« U^fc* 
OUR* 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Central Division 
MICHAEL STRAND, ) 
Plaintiff, \ 
vs. ; 
BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS, ! 
and THE CITIZENS BANK, 
Defendants. 
• AFFIDAVIT 
) Civil No. C85-0315W 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Comes now Lohr Livingston, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1, Prior to September, 1982, Affiant was a Senior Vice 
President of The Citizens Bank, 
2. Pursuant to his duties with The Citizen Bank, Affi-
ant participated as the Loan Officer in relation to February 22, 
1982 loan from the Bank to Plaintiff Mike Strand. 
3. Prior to the execution of the Promissory Note evi-
dencing said indebtedness, the bank extended certain short term 
advances to Plaintiff in anticipation of the closing of said 
loan, 
4. Prior to the negotiations between the parties rela* 
tive to the laon in Question and the advancement of monies in 
reliance on the closing of the loan, Plaintiff had repaid all 
obligations between himself and The Citizens Bank, 
5. The exclusive collateral forthe loan of February 
22, consisted of Plaintiff's personal residence and a airplane 
hanger which was owned by Plaintiff, 
5, The 40,500 shares of Global stock were not pledged 
as collateral for the February loan, 
7, At the time of the execution of the February loan, 
all collateral including the stock in auestion prior loans or 
other obligations of Plaintiff, were released from any and all 
security interests held by the Bank, 
Dated this /-7-V, day of Harch, 1985. 
LOHR LlVlNGST-olT'' 
^w^-v ^ 
(/ 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
March, 1985, 
• < ^ ~ day of 
.•V-" ' r i ' 
Fly Commission Expires 
NO I'AKY WHLlC, res id ing, at 
< • •*»-. „-, / / / /:,,. 7 
s I 
zfreowd ir-ev-e soos/g/e 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVISrOlMfffpo 
*
g O A f n , / 9 f t
 f 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF U T A H S r # f c r ? 
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.C., 
AKA GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, 
L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
> 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MICHAEL W. STRAND AND CARI ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL W. JACKSON 
Civil No. 070700488 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
ALLEN, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Affidavit of I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 070700488 STRAND.MICHAEL W "°~ 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Daniel W. Jackson being first duly sworn depose and say: 
1. I have been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1979. I am over 21 years of age 
and have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and would testify to those facts if 
called as a witness in this case. 
2. From July, 1981 through approximately the summer of 1989, I represented 
Michael W. Strand ("Strand") in numerous transactional and litigation matters. 
3. In the course of my representation of Strand, I met Neuman C. Petty ("Petty") and 
from the late summer of 1981 through the winter of 1988,1 had occasion on innumerable 
i 
occasions to meet with Strand and Petty, travel with Strand and Petty and witness interactions 
between the two individuals. 
4. On or about September 14, 1982, C.I.T. Corporation obtained a judgment against 
Strand for $342,826.76 with 12% interest from September 2, 1982, together with $3,200.00 
attorney fees, and $115.25 costs in which the transcript of judgment was filed on September 16, 
1982, as Civil No. 9576, docket no. S-345, Davis County Clerk's Office. 
5. At the time the above-described transcript of judgment was filed, Strand was the 
owner of the real property more particularly described as: 
04-062-0203 
All of Lot 203, CANYON CREST PLAT NUMBER "9," a sub-
division of part of Section 28, Township 2, North, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of bountiful, according to the 
official plat thereof. 
Which I understand is the subject matter of the above-captioned action and was the personal 
residence of Strand and his wife. 
6. Following the filing of the above-described transcript of judgment, Strand and 
Petty engaged in a course of business dealings under which Strand would assign his assets to 
Pelty and Petty would provide Strand with money to conduct his business affairs and cover his 
personal living expenses. 
7. In furtherance of this course of business, I had several conversations with Strand 
and Petty wherein I described the effects of assignments of interest and foreclosures on the 
interests of judgment creditors and discussed with Strand and Petty approaches that could be 
employed to protect assets owned by Strand from the reach of his numerous creditors including 
but not limited to C.I.T. Corporation, 
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8. Strand and Petty employed my advice and entered into several assignments of 
interest wherein Strand would assign personal property to Petty or his alter ego Nupetco 
Associates based upon Petty's financing of Strand's livelihood. 
9. Following such assignments, Strand would continue to retain control of the 
underlying asset for the benefit of himself and Petty. 
10. One such assignment occurred on April 27, 1983, when for the consideration of 
one dollar and other good and valuable consideration, Strand and his wife assigned a mortgage 
held by them in a car dealership in Burley, Idaho to Nupetco Associates. (Exhibit 1) 
11. On October 11, 1985, Strand obtained a judgment in the Third Judicial District 
Court against the mortgagors of the above-referenced mortgage declaring the mortgage to be 
valid with an unpaid balance of principal and interest in the amount of $522,769.72. (Exhibit 2) 
12. Strand's assignment of that mortgage to Petty was made in consideration of 
Petty's promise to protect Strand's ownership in the real property described above in paragraph 5 
and to continue to work in cooperation with Strand to further their joint business interests. 
13. Petty did not release public notice of the above-described assignment until 
October 18, 1985, just days after he obtained title to Strand's personal residence. (Exhibit 3) 
14. Between April, 1983 and September, 1985,1 was personally present on several 
occasions wherein Strand and Petty discussed the debt owing on Strand's personal residence and 
how to deal with that debt and the other creditors of Strand while allowing Strand to retain the 
possession, use and beneficial ownership of that property. 
15. The plan that emerged from these meetings and discussions was that Petty would 
either purchase the debt owed to Citizens Bank directly from the Bank and foreclose the 
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indebtedness for Strand's protection or bid at any foreclosure sale scheduled by the creditor bank 
and acquire the property free and clear of all similar liens. 
16. In both of the scenarios described above, Petty was acquiring the property for the 
benefit of Strand in consideration of the various assignments, transfers and conveyances of 
personal property given by Strand to Petty in furtherance of their ongoing business arrangement. 
17. Throughout 1984, 1985 and 1986, Strand and Petty worked in absolute concert to 
obtain the full benefit of the Idaho mortgage. This included cooperative legal actions ongoing in 
Utah and Idaho in the name of Strand and Petty. (Exhibit 4) 
18. The actions of Petty and Strand throughout the period in question were directed at 
maximizing the value of Strand's assets for the purpose of benefitting both Strand and Petty. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 2008 
DANIEL W. JACKSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Before me a Notary Public, in and for said state, on this 28th day of February, 2008, 
personally appeared Daniel W. Jackson to me known to be the identical person who executed the 
within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free 
and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. 
r
^ ^ fUSSSSm. I Notary Public 
2157 Lincoln 3W«t f 
Salt Uk* City. Ulah 6*106 I 
March 7.2011 I 
State oKJtah ^  j 
~ 7 ) | ){'v t u n f?r^^ 
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EXHIBIT 1 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Wayne G. Petty, Esq. 
MOYLE I DRAPER, P.C. 
6GQ Deaeret Plaza 
#15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE 
Michael W, Strand and Lois Strand, Assignors, in 
consideration of One Dollar and other good and valuable 
consideration, paid by Nupetco Associates, 2006 South 900 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, Assignee, hereby assign 
unto the Assignee, its successors and assigns, a certain 
Second Mortgage made by Leland Maxtineau, Charles Waters 
and Magic Valley Property, a partnership comprised of the 
aforementioned individuals, as Mortgagors, to Michael W. 
Strand and Lois Strand, Mortgagees, given to secure indebted-
ness between the parties in varying awaunts, but in excess of 
$200,000, dated the 10th day of June, 19&0, recorded on the 
24th day of September, 1980, in the office of the recorder 
of the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, as Entry No. 129331, 
covering the following described premises situated in said 
County: 
Lots 18, Id and 20, Block 3, Johnson's Subdivision 
to the City of Bur ley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho. 
Together with the bond or note or obligation described 
in said Mortgage, and the »onies due and to grow due thereon 
with the interest. 
To have and to hold the seiae unto the Assignee and 
to the successors, legal representatives and assigns of the 
Assignee forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Assignors have duly executed 
this Assignment the £7 gday of ftf>*x\- i 1983. 
Hicha^l- w; Strand ' 
i s Strand1 
k i ^ 
STATE OF UTAH > 
COUNW Q F ^ O j M L t ) 
On the ,?)'( day of {• i \ \ \ i \ , 19B3, pe r sona l ly 
appeared before roe Michael W. St rand and Lois S t rand , the 
s i g n e r s of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: — _JMTTARY P H B L I C J y-*t, \ A \ 
4-/0- as- T e a i a ^ W ^ ^ < j k I * 
123331 
SECOND KOkTCACE 
LELAHD MARTIHEAU, of Sale Lake City, Silt Lake County 
State or Utan, and CHARLES W A T E R S , and HACK VALLEY rROPEtTY. 
a partnership comprised of the eforestentloned Individuals, of 
fturicy. County of Cassia, State of Idaho, Mortgagors, hereby 
HQRTGACE to MICHAEL U. STRAND and LOIS STRAND, mortgagees 
of Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah for tit* lua of 
TEN ($10,00) DOLLARS the following described tract of land in 
Burley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho: 
Lots IB, 19, and 20 Ulock 3, Johnson's Subdivision 
to the City of parley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho 
This Second, Mortage is given to secure the tndebtness 
between the parties in varying amounts, but presently in excess 
of ,:'u0,000.00. 
The mortgagors Agree to pay ell taxes and assessments on 
said premises end a reasonable attorney's fee in case of foreclosure. 
UlTNESS the hands of said mortgagors, this /&OS day of 
June, I960. 
STATE Of UTAH 
as, 
COUKTY OF SALT LAKE 
On this 10th day of June, 19&0, personally appeared before 
ne Loland A, Hartineau, the signer of the within instruftcnt, yho 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the ««•*. 
^J^SAU-. 
Notary Public 
Betiding at Sale Lake City, Utah 
My Comiislon Expires: 
STATE OF tU22£ 
COUNTY Of &&SS&A 
On the /£££*** day of June, H B O , personally appeared before 
»e Charles Waters, the signer of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to tie that he executed the sea*. 
Hotary Public •' 
Residing at; J^J^ ^tijt* ^ t ^ 
^ ^ A .. . ^ , • p .. ^ 
en 
•S1- c*> 
My Ccmmifision Expires; fi* >^ * "  rs»» r yt 
hU% 
STATE OF (tftol ^ & ^ h "H§ 
COUNTY OF SM^T JLAX& 
On the /aT** day of June, I960, person appeared Before 
** *=£&&[& A. /J^X/4B/H\ a partner in Haglc Valley Property, 
who duly acknowledged to »c (hat ho executed the sa*e. 
Notary fubiic , kz> ^ • 
^Keaiding at; ^eU^U^JU. &&fr 
Hy Commission Expires: 
EXHIBIT 2 
United States of America 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
I, p h i l i p R« F i s h i e r Presiding Judge of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and 
lor the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify thai said Court is a Court of Record, having a Clerk and a 
seal; that H. Dixon Hind ley who signed the attestation, is the duly elected and qualified County Clerk of the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, and was at the time ot signing said attestation Ex-Officio Clerk of the said District Court; thai 
said signature is his genuine handwriting; and that all his official acts as such Clerk are entitled to full faith and credit. 
And I further certifv that said attestation is in due form of law. 
Witness my hand this 2 1 day nC- February ^
 A I Q . 19 86_ 
STATE OF UTAH . 
> ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE * 
L H. Dixon Hindle>. County Clerk and Ex-Officio Clerk ofsaid District Court of the County of Salt Lake, Stateof 
Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable P h i l i p R . F i s h i e r whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate, is one of the Judges ofsaid Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the signature ofsaid 
Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the !>eal ofsaid Court, this 21 
day of February
 A < a { 9 < 
JOHN 3\ CAINE #0536 
RICHARDS, CAINE 4 RICHARDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 5. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 8Q1 399-4191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL V. STRAND and MLK INVESTMENTS, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vm. 
ISLAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATERS, 
MAGIC VALLEY aOTQRS, INC., and MAGIC 
VALLSY PROPERTIES, a partnership, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGEMENT 
&4.A0/ fid , Z*JS> 
it -v v i - ¥: 3 JT as?**, 
Civil No. C-$3-56ao 
This matter having come on for trial on September 3, 1995 before 
the Honorable Scott Pamela, Judge of the above entitled Court, plaintiffs 
being personally present and represented by their attorney John T. Caine and 
the defendant Martineau being personally present and represented by his attorney 
Carman Kipp* The trial having commenced and a motion having been mada by the 
defendant and the parties having stipulated to certain facts and the Court being 
fully advised in the premise now makes the following order and judgement: 
J. The mortgage attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a valid 
mortgage given to the plaintiff, Michael Strand by 
leland Martineau and Charles Waters to secure an obligation 
of $327,989.25 which obligation was incurred on or about May 24, 
1979 and which obligation bears interest at the rate of 8% 
from July 1, 1950 to July 1, 1981 and 12% per annum thereafter 
until paid in full, with an unpaid balance of principle and 
interest a*, of October 11, 1985 of $522,769.72, 
2. That any defenses which defendants may have against the validity 
of i>~+ mortgage under either Utah or Idaho lav are hereby 
waived. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
I, H. DIXON HINDLEY, Clerk in and for the County of Salt Lake and Ex-Officio 
Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original 
1 Copy of Order and Judgment (Oct . 3 1 , 1985) 
Michael W. S t r and and MLK Inves tmen t 
v s . 
Leland A. M a r t i n e a u , C h a r l e s Wate r s , 
Magic Va l l ey Motors , I n c . and Magic 
Val ley P r o p e r t i e s 
Case No. C-83-5680 
as appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed my official seal, this ,21s t
 1 
day of ^ £ ^ r u a r y
 A > D < TO 86 
By " A N X ^ ^ W - U J ^ r>/-VNA^^5^ Dfc£uty Clerk 
2 
3. Ifcat p«rauant to Section 75-37-1 (/d laa amended 1953), 
toat plaintiff* ara r«quir«<f to foreclose aaid »ort$rag* 
aaainat tit* property which is located in C***i* County. 
State of Idaho oefore proceeding rnqtinrnt tne peraooei 
aeeetfl of the defendant Mirttneeu. 
4, Skat ai l other claims which either party to thie actios 
•ail havo affainat toe ether, with thm ax captioo of thoee 
eefenaee specifically waived in ptxmgrmph Z art hereby 
r*#«r*otf and regain pendin* in thie Court. 
U*»P U i a i l th day of Octooer, l*d5. 
^<a^«**u'fl; 
SCOTT OlMXfLS 
MSJWCT cowr Jt/oc* 
ATTEST 
EXHIBIT 3 
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that Michael W. Strand and Lois 
Strand, of the County of Davis, State of Utah, hereby give notice that the 
judgement obtained against Leland A. Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley 
Motors, inc., and Magic Valley Properties, a partnership, dated October 11, 
1985, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A") 
i s subject to and governed by that certain Assignment of Mortgage wherein 
Michael W. strand and Lois Strand as assignors, assigned to Wupetco Associates, 
2006 South 900 East that certain obligation which is secured by a certain 
second mortgage made by Leland A. Martineau, Charles Waters and Magic Valley 
Properties a copy of which is attached as Exhibit »B\ 
IN WITNESS whereof this /f*Tiau of October, 1985. 
>>r^^*» 
MICHAEL W. STRAND 
LOIS STRAND 
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES 
*K2J& tmctid. 
EXHIBIT 4 
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE S. FLETCHER 
W h . J A M A PAf iSCNS A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
137 W E S T 13T. S T 8 E E T 
B U ^ L t Y . I D A H O 8 3 3 J 8 
p o e o x £10 
T £ w E P H O N E 
1 2 0 8 ) 6 7 8 - 8 3 3 2 
December 27, 1985 
Mr. John T. Caine 
Attorney at Law 
2563 S. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 34401 
Dear John: 
I am writing to you so that it is clear what Neuman 
will be asking you to obtain• 
Based on the Judgment that you obtained in Civil 
Case C-83-5680 in the Third Judicial District of the State 
of Utah we filed on behalf of Nupetco the foreclosure of the 
Mortgage as the same had been assigned by Strand. 
Martineau now has moved to dismiss the action and 
raises a couple of issues and the most important issue is the 
statute of limitations. In view of the provision of the Judgment 
that any defenses which they may have against the validity of 
the Mortgage either under Utah or Idaho law are hereby waived, 
I would appreciate a transcript as to what was waived. It 
could be argued that the vaiidity of the mortgage was waived 
but I am confident that the limitations of action will be an 
issue. I an enclosing a copy of Idaho Code 5-214A which is 
the limitation of the section that I am concerned about. 
Assuming for a moment that the defendants prevail in 
that Supetco is barred from bringing its action, then can you 
not proceed against the personal assets of Martineau by virtue 
of the Judgment? 
As you can see, John, I neBd all the help I can get 
so that our client is protected. 
Even if the waiver was totally complete I am still 
somewhat concerned about the first paragraph of the statute 
as it was not recorded in the courthouse. 
If the mortgage does net survive in Idaho, then 
perhaps we would be in a position to sue on the Judgment as a 
foreign judgment with the amount due of ?522,000.00. The 
qnly problem with that is that there is an intervening tax lien 
to the State of Idaho but which may expire by the lapse of time. 
Page 2 - John T. Caine 
December 27, 1985 
I guess anorher possibiliry would be for Nuperco 
ro buy our Equirable and hope rhar rhere was a defaulr in 
char regard• 
I have somewhar rambled in rhis letrer bur I wanred 
ro have you aware of rhe problems I am facing in rhe foreclosure 
and a copy of rhe transcripr would cerrainly help insofar as 
whar rhar waiver really means. 
Very rruly yours 
William A. Larsons 
WAP:rr 
Enc. 
cc: Neuman C« Perty 
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE 5. FLETCHER 
W Li. I A M A r - A ^ S O N b 
H f C H A R D A 5 M I T H 
S 4 N D O i . P H C. S>TON£ 
V\ M x t . \ T F L L T C H C R 
A T T O P N C Y S A T LAW 
. 3 7 W E S " 13™ S T R E E T 
BURLEY, I D A H O 83318 
P C BOX 9 I C 
T E L E P H O N E 
1 2 0 8 } 6 7 8 - 8 3 8 2 
April 29, 1986 
John T. Caine 
Attorney at Law 
2 568 South Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Neuman Petty 
Nupetco 
2006 South 9th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
RE: Nupetco Associates v. Martineau, et al 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed are copies of the Answer, Motion for the 
Payment of Costs and Motion to Set Aside Foreign Judgment which 
have been filed in the above case. 
Vera/ truly yojTXS, 
f/^c ^ wr stasia 
William A. Parsons 
WAP:rt 
Enc. 
